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Over the last thirty years, regulators have deregulated just about
every regulated industry. In no industry has deregulation raised as
much fear and concern as in electric power markets. Even before the
Enron debacle, a crisis that is more about the failures of corporate
than regulatory law,1 it was clear that something had gone seriously
wrong in the turn towards deregulation of electric power.
Recent events in California are illustrative. In early 2000, consum
ers in California, the first state to deregulate retail power markets on a
mass scale, saw repeated months of power interruptions. Many utility
customers experienced a risk of service shut off - some even had
their service interrupted - forcing changes in daily routines to find
access to electric power.2 Hospitals, nursing homes, and municipal
utilities controlling sewage and water treatment facilities were forced
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. B.S. 1988, Arizona State;
J.D. 1991, Iowa; LL.M. 1994, Yale. - Ed.

1.

See infra note

40.

2. Adam Bryant,

Lights Out, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2001, at 44 (portraying public school
district students huddled in dark, unheated classrooms as a result of electric power interrup
tions); Renee Sanchez, California's Image Dims as Lights Go Out, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
2001, at Al (presenting image of professors handing out flashlights in college classrooms).
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to make choices affecting human safety when confronted with the
prospect of power interruption.3 Small businesses, families, and large
corporations incurred large costs.4 The consequences of California's
regulatory system were not limited to utility consumers. One of the
state's largest utilities, Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E"), declared
bankruptcy on April 6, 2001, in part the result of the skyrocketing
power procurement costs it has incurred in the deregulatory environ
ment. Its reorganization is now before a federal bankruptcy court.5
Newspaper, television, and radio headlines overwhelmingly attrib
uted the California power crisis to deregulation, or economic restruc
turing, of power markets to favor competitive markets over govern
ment regulation as a means for allocating power supply. Against the
backdrop of such events, calls for a return to old-style regulation have
abounded, often attributing the root cause of California's energy woes
to deregulation itself.6 Even regulators who are not inclined com
pletely to abandon deregulation continue to struggle with refining the
basic path of deregulatory policies, advocating deregulatory models
that incorporate state participation in power procurement, price caps,
or other regulatory safeguards in designing power markets.
The serious book on electric deregulation's failures has yet to be
written - indeed, it will be several years before a comprehensive
scholarly account is available - but this Essay uses three recent books
on the history of regulated industries to address what went wrong in
the turn toward deregulation of electric power.7 The history of utility
3. See Sanchez, supra note 2 (noting potential impact on hospitals);
Planning, Rapid Response Key to Keeping the Lights On, Bus. INS., Apr. 30,

Joanne Wojcik,
2001, at 97 (pre

senting problem hospitals face in planning for unreliable power).
4. See Bryant, supra note 2 (describing how businesses were affected by power interrup
tions); Laura M. Rolson, California Power Crisis Hurts Business and Idles Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al (noting impact of power interruptions on California's economy);
Sanchez, supra note 2 (mentioning that dairy farmers in California were unable to process
milk).
5. In re Pac. Gas & Elec., 263 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001); Tim Reiterman
PG&E Declares Bankruptcy; State's Crisis Plans Collapse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at

et al.,
Al.

6. In California, for example, Governor Gray Davis presented a plan designed to stabi
lize power supply and rates, including state negotiation of power supply contracts and state
purchase of power. See Energy Landscape is Forever Altered, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2001, at
Al. California is not the only state in which deregulation policies are being abandoned. See
Jeremy D. Oller & Donald A. Murry, Cascading Caution: Cascading Crisis Delays Deregula
tion, PUB. UTJL. FORT., Sept. 1, 2001, at 52.
7. Although no books have yet been published on the topic, a number of fine papers and
reports discuss what went wrong in California. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, The Trouble
with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON.
PERSP. 191 (Winter 2002); ERIC HIRST, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: LESSONS
FOR OTHER STATES (Edison Elec. Inst. 2001), available at http://www.eei.org/
issues/comp_reg/CALessons_hirst.pdf; PAUL L. JOSKOW, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY
CRISIS (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8442, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8442; FED. TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: COMPETITION
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSP. ON ELEC. POWER REG. REFORM: Focus ON RETAIL
COMPETITION (2001).
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regulation, addressed in recent books, is a useful place to begin in as
sessing the problems regulators face today. If that history teaches us
anything, it is that firm organization in capital-intensive industries is
cyclical and evolutionary, and often influenced as much by technologi
cal change as by greed or politics.
The history of regulation also teaches us that regulatory policy including deregulation - is not made in a jurisdictional vacuum. A
statutory framework defined in Part II of the Federal Power Act, a
New Deal-era statute enacted by Congress in 1935, gives federal
regulators extensive powers but also places authority over many elec
tric power policies in the hands of the states.8 To the extent that state,
rather than federal, policymakers are fashioning policies, different ju
risdictional fora will produce many of the regulatory frameworks for
electric power. If extreme or parochial factions, as may be more likely
in state as opposed to national politics, successfully capture front-end
market design of power markets, state politics is more likely to lead to
dysfunctional markets than national approaches to restructuring.
I shall argue that, although wrong-headed deregulation policies
contributed to California's crisis, the California deregulation fiasco il
lustrates the significance of the political process that produces the sub
stance of economic regulation. Because it defines the jurisdictional
scope for this process, the legal resolution of jurisdictional boundaries
plays a significant role in the development of sound deregulatory poli
cies. The law of regulatory federalism - defined broadly to include
federal preemption doctrine, the dormant commerce clause, and state
action immunity to antitrust enforcement - should find ways to en
courage desirable participation and discourage undesirable interest
group capture of the state political process. Regulatory federalism
doctrines, central to current disputes involving electric power before
the federal courts, are largely downplayed in the literature on the his
tory of monopoly and regulation, including the three books reviewed
in this Essay. The recent disputes in electric regulation challenge fu
ture authors to write the long overdue chapter on how jurisdictional
boundaries have adversely affected economic regulation of the electric
power sector, as well as other regulated industries.
I.

THE HISTORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY IN THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY CONTEXT

Monopolies in America: Empire Builders and Their Enemies from
Jay Gould to Bill Gates is another tour de force by Charles R. Geisst.9

8. 16 U.S.C.§§ 824-824(m) (1994).
9. Geisst, a finance professor at Manhattan College, is also author of WALL STREET: A
HISTORY (1997).He has written a dozen books on the history of capitalism, making him one
of the leading popular audience authorities on the topic.
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Geisst begins his account with reference to the motto of the popular
board game Monopoly1° - "Accumulate as much property as possible
and win" (p. 1) - which he sees as strikingly consistent with the prin
ciples of monopolistic industries. Geisst admirably traces the evolution
of monopolies and their control in the U.S., focusing on legal and po
litical efforts to effectuate control over the monopolistic tendencies he
sees as inherent in capitalist economies. A colorful illustration of some
of the most influential industrial and financial titans in U.S. history Cornelius "Commodore" Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, J.P. Morgan, John D.
Rockefeller - as well as the effort of courts and legislators to curb
their power, Geisst's account spans more than a century, but it does
not delve in depth into any period or specific legal doctrine. Much, if
not most, of his effort focuses on antitrust enforcement.
Throughout the book, however, he also touches on regulated utili
ties, monopolies that are not targeted by antitrust enforcers but are in
stead granted and protected by law. His illustrations include tradi
tional public utility industries, such as railroads, telecommunications,
and the electric power industry. Geisst briefly explains, for example,
that for most of the twentieth century, and to a degree even today,
electric power was provided by the investor-owned "public utility."
Under this firm structure, which was reinforced by regulatory law,
high degrees of vertical and horizontal integration were the norm. A
private company offered consumers a bundle of services, including
generation, distribution, and transmission, typically while operating as
a monopolist serving a geographic service territory subject to heavy
regulation by federal and state agencies. For most of the twentieth
century, this regulatory regime was stable for both the investor and
the consumer. Utility stocks were notoriously low-risk, reliable in
vestments, thus explaining the cheapness of the public utility square
on the Monopoly board. With few exceptions, electric utilities were
well suited to providing consumers with reliable, dependable electrical
service.11
Geisst weaves a fascinating story, describing through anecdotes the
historical development of government regulation of monopolies such
as electric power. His history is robust in scope, touching on dozens of
industries, including not just traditional public utilities but also book
publishing, computer, and food manufacturing industries. His general
thesis is that "[m]onopoly is the logical outcome of free market eco
nomic organization" (p. 319). More specifically, he sees regulation as
"the antidote if that power overextends itself and ceases to provide
benefits" (p. 319). Since Geisst understands regulation as largely
10. Hasbro, Inc., produces and holds registered trademarks to "Monopoly."
11. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of Consumers in
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1233 (1998)
(discussing this history).
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serving political goals, he is able to weave an intriguing story through
many colorful historical and political anecdotes. His book provides an
easily accessible and nicely pitched popular history or introduction for
a lay audience.
The book charitably introduces monopoly's early critics. Geisst
summarizes many of the arguments made by Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., who wrote a series of essays illustrating the financial problems that
monopolies, especially the railroads, posed during the Guilded Age
(pp. 18-23). The origins of regulation, on Geisst's account, were pre
dominantly ideological and political, rather than economic: "From the
beginning of the battle, economics and ideology would be mixed in an
acrimonious argument about who knew what was best for the coun
try" (p. 23). But on Geisst's account, economics took a backseat to
political ideology. Adams and others who pushed for state regulation12
were, according to Geisst, reformers driven predominantly by their
progressive political beliefs.13
With masterful attention to detail, Geisst provides an account of
regulatory and antitrust law as mediating between tempered private
competition, which is permissible, and the accumulation of power by
industrial firms, which Geisst deems undesirable. In both its early ac
counts and later descriptions of the development of antitrust law and
regulation, however, Geisst's book gives little attention to more rigor
ous methodological accounts of the goals of antitrust or regulatory
law. Like many other historical accounts, it fails to present a coherent
economic theory of monopoly or regulation.14 Thus, while Geisst re
minds us of many colorful anecdotes and examples, his book does not
provide the background methodological account most students of
policy or regulatory reformers will demand. For instance, beyond a
few broad-brush descriptions of "schools" of economic thought, such
as the Chicago School, Geisst does not take seriously economic meth
ods as a way for explaining approaches to regulatory enforcement.
As Geisst explains it, for example, federal regulation of railroads
and federal remedies for smashing monopolies under the antitrust
12. Adams lobbied for Massachusetts' creation of a Board of Railroad Commissioners
in 1869 and became one of its original members.
13. By contrast, other historical accounts focus on nascent neo-classical economic prin
ciples reflected in the writings of reformers such as Adams. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991). Geisst is not unaware of these princi
ples - he acknowledges that Adams' writings, for example, "provided the basis for what
would become known as the Harvard school of antitrust economics," p. 46, but he probably
downplays their significance as ideas in history as it was unfolding.
14. It is on similar grounds, for example, that Herbert Hovenkamp critiques the work of
other historical accounts of the same period, such as those presented in LEE BENSON,
MERCHANTS, FARMERS AND RAILROADS: RAILROAD REGULATION AND NEW YORK
POLITICS, 1850-1887 (1955); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916
(1965); GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 131-36.
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laws arose in the late nineteenth century because "the tide had shifted
against the states' attempts to control the railroads as early as 1871"
(p. 32). Supreme Court cases recognizing limits on state authority15
thwarted the effectiveness of well-intentioned state regulators, effec
tuating a "clear acknowledgement that federal law, not just a patch
work of state law and court rulings, would be necessary to control the
railroads" (p. 32). Geisst deserves credit for paying attention to regu
latory federalism early in our history of regulating monopoly, but he is
less interested in providing a synthetic methodological explanation of
regulation than in telling the larger story of its politics.16
By focusing predominantly on politics, not economic method,
Geisst downplays contemporary and historical evidence suggesting
how technological change contributes to firm structure and to concen
tration in public utility industries such as electric power. Instead,
Geisst places at the fore of his historical account conflicts between
profits and populist politics. This theme runs throughout the twentieth
century as Geisst surveys the Wilson era, the establishment the
Tennessee Valley Authority, passage of the National Industry Recov
ery Act, the adoption of the Glass-Steagal Act and later developments
such as Nader's corporate raiders, the breakup of AT&T, and the
Microsoft antitrust case. Geisst presents convincing evidence of the
durability of the tension between profits and bigness, on the one hand,
and the public interest and government regulation, on the other. He
nicely illustrates how this tension survived a number of historical eras,
presenting an account that will appeal to a broad popular audience.
But historical synthesis of such a range of events comes at a price.
Although it brims with fascinating stories, Geisst's wide-ranging his
tory provides little, if any, serious method to mediate the conflicts that
repeatedly play out in the events. The discerning reader is left grasp
ing for some methodological account of regulation, or some explana
tion for why regulation exists independent of its politics. Geisst nicely
positions the origins of railroad regulation in the context of federalism,
but he does not address the federalism problems with regulation be
yond the Gilded Age, including the many problems that have thwarted
regulatory law from promoting its goals throughout the twentieth cen
tury.

15. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (holding
that a state does not have authority to regulate the intrastate portion of an interstate ship
ment).
16. Many other well-regarded histories of the period have been described as disap
pointing in this same respect. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 136 ("Failure to appreciate
the complexity of Gilded Age regulatory policy in a federalist system has led historians to
easy oversimplifications about the nature of regulation." ).
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THE MOVEMENT TO DEREGULATION AND THE PROBLEMS WITH
PARTIAL DEREGULATION

A more complete historical account of regulation sees the devel
opment of the vertically integrated public utility as closely related to
technological change, not primarily motivated by investor greed or
politics. In the late nineteenth century, for example, the electric power
industry began with high degrees of decentralization. Only with the
development of the technologies of the central station and alternating
current did concentration and vertical integration become economi
cally practical. Concentration provided benefits not only to utility in
vestors, but also to consumers, to the extent the technology of the cen
tral station allowed coordination between supply and use in ways that
enhanced the availability and reliability of power supply and mini
mized costs. 17
Academic historian Richard F. Hirsh's Power Loss: The Origins of
Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System

gives us an account of the origins of electric power deregulation.18
Hirsh sets out to discern the historical origins of deregulation, but be
gins by addressing the origins of regulation. For him, regulation's ori
gins can be traced to a "utility consensus" (p. 2) produced by a mana
gerial elite that exerted power through "the manipulation of
individuals and state institutions to obtain results that directly profit
them."19 Without explicitly invoking public choice theory, Hirsh illus
trates how "shrewd power company executives realized that state
oversight meant governmental acceptance of their companies as natu
ral monopolies, which brought with it a host of benefits (p. 23). He
does not see progressivism as irrelevant to the utility consensus, but he
sees the utility consensus as drawing heavily on the progressive idea of
delegation to a body of elites rather than implementing directly pro
gressive political values (p. 30). With time, progressive objectives
would become frustrated, as power company executives would "main
tain . . . a cozy relationship with regulators" (p. 45) and close the
power network (p. 51), leading regulators to play a "subordinate role
to power company managers" (p. 41).
17. For an excellent discussion of this history, see HAROLD L. PLAIT, THE ELECTRIC
CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 59-92 (1991).
18. His book is a nice companion - and largely complementary - to the classic modern
economic assessment in PAUL JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER
(1983).
19. P. 2. Hirsh clarifies that his notion of utility consensus is not to be confused with the
"regulatory contract," which has been used by utility executives to argue that regulation has
created a set of legally enforceable obligations. P. 4; see also J. GREGORY SIDAK & DAN F.
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE
COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1997).
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Hirsh properly sees the movement toward deregulation as a com
plex interaction of political, economic, and technological forces. State
cost-of-service regulation of the public utility worked well so long as it
resulted in lower-cost electricity for consumers. But by the 1970s,
state-centered cost-of-service regulation was no longer seen as an ef
fective way to keep electricity prices uniformly low. Politically, federal
regulators saw early steps toward deregulation - taken in President
Carter's 1977 Energy Plan and endorsed by Congress in the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA") (pp. 75, 101-05)
- as a way to avoid the disasters of excess capacity wrought by over
building large plants, primarily nuclear, in the 1960s and 1970s, along
with post-1968 inflation and higher prices of oil after the 1973 oil em
bargo. "After PURPA began to be implemented . . . it looked as if the
utility system, like Humpty Dumpty after his fall, would never be the
same again" (p. 131). Economically, deregulation was - and, to many,
still is - seen as good industrial growth policy, as the largest benefici
aries of deregulation have been large industrial companies who,
against the backdrop of liberalized supply options, were positioned to
bargain for lower cost energy inputs (p. 248). Since, by the 1990s, retail
rates varied widely from state to state, states themselves saw deregula
tion as a way to even out geographic differences in the cost of power.20
Moreover, technologically, deregulation provided an opportunity
for more efficient electric supply options to flourish. Hirsh's history
recognizes the importance of technological change in making possible
and popularizing deregulation as a regulatory reform approach in the
utility industry.21 By the late 1970s, technological improvements made
smaller scale generation projects more feasible, reducing the depend
ence on long-term capital commitments for purposes of securing fi
nancing in the industry (pp. 105-08). Since the late 1970s, most
economists have recognized power generation as a structurally com
petitive sector of the industry, although power distribution and trans
mission remain natural monopolies even today in the eyes of most
economists (pp. 101-17). Transmission line and coordination technol
ogy, as well as distribution and metering technology, have also ad
vanced significantly in recent years, providing new alternatives to
firms who concentrate their efforts in these sectors of the industry
(pp. 262-63).
With technological improvements in electric generation and distri
bution, the gains from treating generation as competitive, whether po
litical or economic, were far more significant than they might have
20. In 1991, for example, Californians paid retail rates that were thirty to fifty percent
above the national average. P. 253.
21. In fact, an earlier book by Hirsh focuses exclusively on this theme in the history of
electric power regulation. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1989).
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been in previous eras. Thus, while deregulation of the industry may
have benefited investors and some large companies, it is overly sim
plistic to describe the movement, as many might suggest, as predomi
nantly driven by greed and politics. When technological advances cre
ated the prospect of efficiency gains, continuing to protect the
monopoly of older technology imposed significant costs on consumers.
The old structure to regulating utilities - based on approval of cost
of-service rates - placed all of the risk of poor investments on the
ratepayer, not the investor. The prospect of deregulation shifted these
risks away from the ratepayer and placed them where they belong on utility investors.
Taking the movement to deregulation full circle, Hirsh ties the
trend toward deregulation to the fate of utility managers. According to
him, all of these developments - political, economic, technological led to a transition, if not dissolution, of the utility consensus
(pp. 267-69). "[P]ower company executives lost authority because not
all of them sought to maintain the terms of the original consensus,
with some openly seeking to dissolve the traditional structure of the
system" (p. 264). New interest groups - such as independent power
producers, public power, and conservation-minded interest groups displaced utility executives as the predominant or elite groups in state
and federal regulatory politics (p. 268).
Both Geisst and Hirsh provide historical accounts, and in doing so
have something to say about the process of regulation and deregula
tion. But as historians they do not focus on the substantive goals of
regulation, or on any method for evaluating its merits. Looking to de
regulation in electric power's sister industry, natural gas, Paul
MacAvoy, a highly-regarded academic regulatory economist, makes
the case for completely deregulating the natural gas industry in The
Natural Gas Market: Sixty Years of Regulation and Deregulation.

22

MacAvoy convincingly argues that partial deregulation has im
peded consumers and other interest groups from realizing the full
gains of natural gas deregulation. Unlike Geisst and Hirsh, who draw
on historical methodologies to shed light on regulatory law, MacAvoy
uses an econometric model to assess the effects of deregulation of
natural gas on various stakeholders, including producers, pipelines,
and consumers. Prior to natural gas deregulation, the natural gas mar
ket experienced widespread shortages, followed by a bubble period
during the 1980s. MacAvoy believes that the industry began improving
22. MacAvoy is a professor at the Yale School of Management and the author of a
number of works on natural gas, railroad and telecommunications deregulation. He co
authored ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974) with Justice
(then Professor) Stephen Breyer.His other studies of the natural gas industry include PRICE
FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS: A STUDY OF COMPETITION, MONOPSONY AND
REGULATION (1962); and THE ECONOMICS OF THE NATURAL GAS SHORTAGE, 1960-1980
(1975) with Robert S. Pindyck.
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its prior dismal performance once federal deregulation policies were
implemented. As MacAvoy illustrates, the deregulatory policies initi
ated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") in
1985 and culminating with Order No. 636 in 1992 have created high
levels of economic performance in the industry and have led to an in
creased use of in-ground storage of gas, helping to ensure adequate
supply (p. 17).
"Partial deregulation" policies, however, have impeded the degree
of improvement in the natural gas industry. For example, MacAvoy
observes that "gas reserves and gas production have not greatly ex
panded after Order 636" (p. 93). Without a doubt, the Order has con
tributed to high natural gas prices. According to MacAvoy, the reason
for this limited growth is that FERC's policies in Order No. 636 con
strain markets for spot gas and transport capacity.23 As MacAvoy's
econometric model illustrates, substantial gains could be realized by
consumers, pipelines, and consumers if FERC further deregulated
pipeline capacity (p. 98). MacAvoy believes that federal regulators
should remove "tariff rates on released and firm capacity between
major hubs" and set benchmark tariffs to limit the exercise of market
power (p. 99).
Moreover, MacAvoy argues, the gains of deregulation have been
thwarted by the actions of state regulators. The unbundling of markets
for retail gas and distribution remains largely in the hands of state
regulators and subject to state politics. Many states - twenty-three
plus the District of Columbia at the time of MacAvoy's study (p. 100)
- have implemented programs that would allow small residential or
commercial customers to "unbundle" retail service, separating the de
livery of gas from transportation and storage (p. 105). Unbundling, as
MacAvoy suggests, holds out the "promise of deregulation" to the ex
tent that consumers could purchase services from sources that are not
subject to rate regulation by states (p. 105).
But as MacAvoy reminds us, there is "no empirical foundation for
the position that vertical separation of gas ownership, transport and
billing reduces costs; indeed, there would be an increase in transaction
costs with more transactions" (p. 105). In fact, MacAvoy suggests, with
unbundling many state and local regulators have imposed require
ments for "utility line access, system balancing, and load forecasting"
(p. 111). To be sure, state regulators liave imposed such requirements
for the hope of continued reliability and consumer protection in their
respective jurisdictions. But MacAvoy believes that unbundling to

23. In Order No. 636, for example, FERC retained price regulation of both firm and re
lease capacity, which has limited the expansion of pipeline transportation and adversely af
fected prices and quantities. Pp. 94-95. According to MacAvoy, "[t]hese limits act like rent
control in a housing market, creating disincentives to provide more capacity, whether by the
pipeline or by the shipper in release contracts." P. 95.
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create the benefits of competition has created a political need for fur
ther intervention in individual transactions by state regulatory agen
cies, thwarting the gains from natural gas competition (p. 111). In his
final analysis, MacAvoy argues that natural gas markets could realize
price gains of as much as twenty percent by eliminating federal and
state regulation of transmission and distributor systems (p. 120).
Ill.

MARKET DESIGN ORTAXATION AS A MECHANISM FOR
PROVIDING FOR PUBLIC GOODS?

Geisst, Hirsh, and MacAvoy tell us a great deal about how the
regulatory process and regulatory law have failed as we embarked
upon the deregulatory path in California and other states. In the elec
tric power sector, regulators and legislators have almost exclusively re
sponded to political signals and short-sighted concerns with profitabil
ity in formulating state plans for electric power competition. While the
popular press's anecdotes of deregulatory policies, especially in states
like California, would nicely complement and continue a history that
sees such events as the result of progressive politics or regulatory cap
ture, these anecdotes give short shrift to the technological innovations
that Hirsh correctly sees as a central motivation of the deregulation
movement.
If, as MacAvoy argues, partial deregulation has impeded realiza
tion of the benefits of gas regulation, it is more likely to thwart the
gains of competition in electric power. Thus, MacAvoy's study of par
tial deregulation of natural gas markets provides an important analog
for understanding many of the specific failures in California and fed
eral electric power deregulatory policies. For example, federal regula
tors completely deregulated wholesale electric power supply markets
when FERC adopted Order No. 888 in 1996. That order implemented
open access to transmission facilities in wholesale power supply mar
kets. Against this backdrop, some states, like California, have deregu
lated markets subject to state control; others, like Florida, have stead
fastly resisted any movement towards deregulation.
California's deregulation plan included a price cap on retail power,
designed to protect retail consumers.24 During the year 2000, however,
price caps forced the state's utilities between a fiscal rock and a hard
place when supply shortages sent wholesale prices skyrocketing. At
the same time, California's utilities were allowed to recover billions of
dollars in subsidies through stranded cost surcharges and access fees
- dollars paid to utilities by consumers and competitors that often

24.

See A.B.

CODE§§

1890 § 854, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, codified in relevant part at CAL. PUB. UTIL.
330-398.5 (West Supp. 2001).
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lined the fisc of the electric utility's parent.25 With deregulation,
California also failed to reassess its state power plant siting laws for
the competitive market, creating uncertainty for even those investors
who wanted to build generation plants to serve California consumers.26
MacAvoy, however, warns policymakers against glorifying unbun
dling, or a single preferred firm structure, in a competitive market
(pp. 105-06). The fetish for unbundling among reformers, while a nice
counter-juxtaposition to the predominant organizational form, may
prove dangerous if technological innovations coupled with economic
incentives swing back toward a need for convergence of services in the
industry. California regulators, for example, experimented with efforts
to dictate firm structure in electric power. Their establishment of the
Power Exchange led to a prohibition against suppliers offering long
term contracts, a regulation designed to keep suppliers from locking
into a market and migrating toward a vertically integrated structure.27
While a well-intentioned effort to bolster a growth in competitive spot
markets for power supply, this prohibition eviscerated one of the most
important financing tools for attracting power investors. It also poten
tially exposed consumers to price volatilities, otherwise softened
through long-term contracts.28 The prohibition on long-term contracts
also worked to favor incumbent supply firms, providing them fertile
opportunities for strategic manipulation of the market.29

25. See Michael A. Yuffee, California's Electricity Crisis: How Best to Respond to the
"Perfect Storm," 22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 71 (2001); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi,
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000) (criticizing stranded cost
recovery); Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 297 (1998)
(same).
26. See Yuffee, supra note 25, at 68 (describing state's "extremely complex " generation
siting and permitting procedures).
27. California's restructuring policies included a buy-sell requirement, prohibiting utili
ties from acquiring power through forward-looking contracting, which was to remain effec
tive until all utilities recovered their stranded costs. Pursuant to this requirement, all inves
tor-owned utilities were required to bid all of their generation into a power exchange and
were required to purchase all of their power from the power exchange. See Preferred Policies
Governing Restructuring California's Electric Service Industry and Reforming Regulation,

166 Pub. Util. Reg. 24 (Dec. 20, 1995). The requirement and its rationales are discussed in
Yuffee, supra note 25, at 69.
28. California Power Exch. Corp. v. FERC, 245 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001).
29. See Yuffee, supra note 25, at 70-71; see also California Power Exchange, 245 F.3d at
1116 (noting that FERC determined that over-reliance "on the spot market also exposed
the . . . [utilities] to the possible exercise of market power " by wholesale suppliers). As a
remedy, FERC eliminated the power exchange buy/sell requirement, inviting the use of for
ward-looking contracting. Id. FERC observed that "eliminating any mandated reliance on
the spot market represents the single most important aspect of wholesale market reform and
is one of the most critical components of all of the immediate market reforms necessary to
correct the problems in California electric markets and provide long-term protection of cus
tomers." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The remedy, however, did not provide California
utilities the relief they needed against the backdrop of the retail price cap.
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As these examples illustrate, the problem in California was not
necessarily deregulation. Instead, the problem was the way in which
state regulators designed deregulated power markets to provide for
public goods, such as consumer and environmental protection, par
ticularly against the background of federal regulatory policies encour
aging competition in the same industry. Misguided regulatory backlash
in reaction to failed deregulatory policies may produce significant so
cial costs, eerily echoing the same concerns that gave rise to the de
mand for deregulation in the first place. Consider, for example, the
now widely known source of California's power woes: demand for
power outstripping supply. The obviously simple solution of building
more plants, especially if subsidized with tax benefits or by consumer
rates, or if planned by state or federal regulators, places the risk of an
other overcapacity problem with the public or consumers - not with
investors, where it belongs. Thus, the obviously simple policy solution
here leads to costly and absurd results.
The California deregulation fiasco was created by state regulators'
misguided efforts to provide for public goods in the face of deregu
lated energy markets, not necessarily by deregulation itself. The provi
sion of public goods, such as consumer and environmental protection,
is an important policy for state regulators. In California, however, the
mechanisms for public good provision were misplaced and contributed
to dysfunctional power markets - especially since California policy
makers failed to anticipate how their new power markets might actu
ally operate in practice.
While California regulators attempted to provide for public goods
in ex ante market design, this approach created at least two problems.
First, a focus on front-end market design may itself be flawed if looked
to as the primary mechanism for providing for public goods. Taxation
mechanisms are the most efficient way to provide for pubic goods, be
cause they create the fewest price distortions and avoid the strategic
ma,nipulation opportunities created by planned efforts at market de
sign. Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, for example, argue
that the fairness of legal rules is best ensured through back-end taxa
tion measures rather than in front-end architecture or design.30 Legal
rules, they observe, are designed to affect only small fractions of the
population and, at best, accomplish only crude redistribution. As they
state, "redistribution through legal rules entails both the inefficiency
of redistribution generally (due to adverse effects on work incentives)
and the additional cost involved in adopting less efficient legal rules."31
30. See Louis Kaplow
961 (2001).

&

Steven Shaven,

Fairness Versus Welfare,

114 HARV. L. REV.

31. Id. at 994; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Should Legal Rules Favor the
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J.
LEG. STUD. 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System is Less Effi
cient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 667 (1994).
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On their analysis, the price distortions and other adverse effects of
front-end redistributive policies imposed through rules of market de
sign, including these effects on strategic behavior, can create serious
inefficiencies. By contrast, the imposition of taxes to support redis
tributive policies minimizes both price distortions and strategic ma
nipulation of the market. If Kaplow and Shavell are correct, taxation
mechanisms are the best way for deregulated electric power markets
to minimize price distortions while also enhancing social welfare. Fed
eral regulators have adopted this approach, however imperfectly, in
the context of telecommunications deregulation, where something
akin to a tax, rather than a service mandate, finances universal service.
A second problem with California's approach to electric power de
regulation was a practical result of the state political process in which
it was adopted. More than deregulation in the contexts of telecommu
nications or natural gas deregulation, electric power deregulation is
the result of state political processes. In California, for instance, the
deregulation plan adopted in 1996 included many front-end market
design mechanisms designed to appease consumer groups so that state
legislators could assure their constituents that deregulation would lead
to rate reductions. In retrospect, the California Assembly could not
have been more wrong! California adopted one market model, mixing
it with incompatible features. According to the distinguished econo
mist Paul Joskow, "It was an accident waiting to happen from day
one."32
Even where front-end market design might work, the political pa
thologies of the state political process are certain to make its success
even less likely. At best, it will probably result in "partial deregula
tion," akin to the phenomenon critiqued by MacAvoy, by retaining
patchwork regulation but for the wrong reasons and in the wrong
form.
IV.

REGULATORY FEDERALISM AND EFFICIENT ELECTRIC POWER
(DE-)REGULATION

Ultimately, a major source of the problem with deregulation of
electric power can be traced to the eighteenth-century origins of fed
eral railroad regulation discussed in Geisst's book. As with railroad
regulation, a jurisdictional divide in electric power regulation between
federal and state regulators threatens the ability of even well
intentioned state regulators to implement efficient regulatory policies
in the electric industry. This divide has been a longstanding issue of
contention in electric power regulation. For instance, when Rhode
Island attempted to regulate the rates charged by a Rhode Island plant
32. Arthur O'Donnell,
2002, at 20.

Economists and the Golden State,

PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1,
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selling electricity to a Massachusetts company, which then resold elec
tricity to the city of Attleboro, Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated the regulation because it imposed a "direct burden upon
interstate commerce."33 This limitation on state regulation, which cre
ated the "Attleboro gap" (an area in which neither federal nor state
regulators had jurisdiction), led Congress to adopt Part II of the Fed
eral Power Act in 1935, giving federal authorities jurisdiction over
interstate electricity transactions that are beyond the scope of state
authority.
But leaving even residual authority over regulation to the states
raises difficulties for regulatory law. The strongest interest groups may
more readily capture the regulatory process in state politics than in na
tional politics, thereby thwarting the goals of both federal and state
regulatory policies. To the extent that state politics enhances the par
ticipation of stakeholders in the regulatory process - and the lower
costs of participation in state and local politics holds particular prom
ise in this regard - the state forum has many advantages over federal
regulation for the development of economic regulatory policies. State
governments, for example, are routinely touted as laboratories of de
mocracy, encouraging policy experimentation that the federal gov
ernment would find unwieldy because of the heterogeneity of interest
groups at the federal level and the costs associated with national im
plementation of policies.
At the same time, however, states allow more extreme interest
groups to influence the content of policies, since those interest groups
are not required to build coalitions with others in the more diverse na
tional forum, where extreme factions are less likely to influence policy.
For reasons Madison articulated in The Federalist No. 10 - well
chronicled in modern public choice literature - constituent groups,
including industrial consumers, environmental groups, and consumer
interests, are more likely to organize into dysfunctional factions at the
state level, as opposed to in national politics.34 Such factions can ad
versely influence the content of economic regulation. Moreover, the
state political process is more prone to favor interest groups with pa
rochial concerns, rather than those that are likely to favor concerns af
fecting matters outside of a given state. As Hirsh's study of deregula
tion indicates, in electric power restructuring many of the interest
groups favoring competitive markets are out-of-state stakeholders,
prone to clash with the interests of in-state rivals who have held mo
nopolies for more than a half century.35
33. See Pub. Util. Comm'n of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S.
83, 89 (1927).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
35. For one commentator's view of how state and local political processes may not be as
effective as federal processes in reflecting the values of constituents, see Clayton P. Gillette,
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Against the backdrop of the state political process and its produc
tion of laws and policies conflicting with federally created wholesale
power markets, regulatory federalism issues define a number of legal
disputes facing the industry today. For example, a recent U.S.
Supreme Court case addresses the jurisdictional issues in FERC's 1996
restructuring order, known as Order No. 888. In Order No. 888, FERC
took a major step toward implementing wholesale power competition
by requiring utilities subject to its jurisdiction to adopt a standard tar
iff offering transmission service to customers other than retail custom
ers on a nondiscriminatory basis. FERC's order asserted preemptive
authority to prescribe such requirements notwithstanding the exis
tence of state rules to the contrary. FERC, however, declined to assert
jurisdiction over the transmission component embedded in traditional
retail sales service to native load customers. On appeal, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the open access requirements
as well as the jurisdictional rulings FERC made in Order No. 888.36
The Court affirmed that FERC's jurisdiction extended to transmission
even where the generating plant and consumer were located in the
same state.37 While FERC's Order No. 888 did not require all jurisdic
tional utilities to unbundle the transmission component of service
from retail sale services, the D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC's more
restrictive reading of the statute, which deferred to state jurisdiction
over bundled service, was permissible and subject to deference by the
court.38
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted two petitions for certio
rari to review the D.C. Circuit's jurisdictional rulings.39 State regula
tory officials brought the first appeal, which maintained that FERC's
assertion of authority over intrastate transmission reached too far by
including unbundled retail transmissions of electricity widening the
scope of its open access requirements. The other appeal, brought by
Enron,40 the now infamous power marketer, maintained that FERC's
Comment, Interest Groups in the 21st Century City, 32 URB. LAW. 423 (2000); see also Clay
ton P. Gillette, Jn Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local
Government Law, 67 CHI. KENT L. R EV. 959 (1991).
36.
2000).

See

Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir.

37.

Id.

at 693-95.

38.

Id.

at 694-95.

39.

See New York

v. FERC, 69 U.S.L.W. 3574 (Feb. 26, 2001) (Nos. 00-568 and 00-809).

40. Of course, by Spring 2002, Enron had announced the largest bankruptcy in United
States history. Enron's collapse and the subsequent scandal over Enron's corporate financial
reporting seem to be driven primarily by internal management decisions, not the external
deregulatory policies under which Enron often operated. To the extent regulatory policies
played a direct role in Enron's financial failure, these were corporate disclosure policies, not
policies related to competition in electric power. However, failure of regulators to effectively
monitor power marketers' claims of supply and demand did allow Enron and others to ma
nipulate markets for financial gain. See Richard Behr, Papers Show that Enron Manipulated
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assertion of jurisdiction did not go far enough and that FERC is re
quired to extend its open access remedy to bundled retail transmis
sions.
The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals and issued a sin
gle opinion upholding the D.C. Circuit's approval of FERC's Order
No. 888
the most significant opinion in decades to define the scope
of federal power to implement competition in electric power mar
kets.41 The Court observed that the Federal Power Act did not, in its
express language, evidence a congressional intent to safeguard preex
isting state regulation of the delivery of electricity to retail customers,42
and that FERC was careful not to attempt to exercise control over lo
cal distribution facilities.43 Thus, the Court concluded, the Federal
Power Act "unquestionably supports" FERC's assertion of jurisdic
tion "to regulate the unbundled transmissions of electricity retailers."44
Effectively, the Court held that the Federal Power Act was not limited
in its jurisdiction to closing the "Attleboro gap," but also extend fed
eral jurisdiction to the regulation of wholesale sales that had previ
ously been subject to state jurisdiction.
As if this holding was not enough to empower federal regulators,
the Enron argument invited the Court to further clarify the expansive
scope of federal power over competition in electric power. In rejecting
Enron's argument that FERC had held itself powerless to assert juris
diction to remedy undue discrimination in bundled retail transmissions
of electricity, the Court made it very clear that FERC had this author
ity.45 Although FERC did not error in failing to exercise it in Order
No. 888, which concerned discrimination in the wholesale market, the
Court observed that if "FERC were to investigate this alleged [retail]
discrimination and make findings concerning undue discrimination in
the retail electricity market," the Federal Power Act "would require
FERC to provide a remedy for that discrimination."46
-

California Crisis, WASH. POST, May 7, 2002, at Al; Kathryn Kranhold and Rebecca Sedth,
Two Other Firms in Enron Scheme, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2002, at Al; Richard A. Oppel, Jr.,
How Enron Got California to Buy Power It Didn't Need, N. Y.TIMES, May 8, 2002, at Cl.

41. New York v.Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 1012 (2002).
42. Id. at 1024. The language of the Federal Power Act gives FERC jurisdiction over
the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and . .. the sale of such energy
at wholesale in interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). According to the Court, this lan
guage limits FERC's jurisdiction over the sale of power to the wholesale market, but
authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over transmission, without regard to whether transmissions
are sold to a reseller or directly to a retail customer. New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct. at 1024.
43. Id. at 1026. This was important because 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) precludes FERC from
asserting jurisdiction "over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facili
ties used in local distribution . ... "
44. New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct. at 1026.
45.

Id.

46.

Id.

at 1028.

Electric Deregulation

May 2002]

1785

Even where federal policymakers have not expressly asserted ju
risdiction, legal doctrines play an important role in minimizing market
distortions created by the state regulatory process. Because interest
groups are more readily able to capture the state regulatory process,
as well as states' deregulation policies, state laws could potentially
thwart full evolution of markets in electric power. If markets in elec
tric power are to flourish, courts will be asked to clarify the role of ad
ditional doctrines, such as federal preemption doctrine, the dormant
commerce clause, and state action doctrine in limiting state regulators.
In fashioning limits on state regulatory power, courts must balance the
advantages of state power, including its promotion of experimentation
and the lower cost political participation it offers home-turf
stakeholders, with its costs, many of which are related to the nonde
mocratic implications of adverse interest group behavior in the regula
tory process.
Approaches of regulators in California and Florida, for example,
illustrate how, in the state regulatory process, front-end market design
can serve as a forum for interest group capture of the regulatory proc
ess. In California, regulators protected in-state consumers by coupling
the state's deregulation plan with retail price caps, even though whole
sale power markets were not subject to price caps. When wholesale
power prices increased by more than 500% in the second half of 1999
and the second half of 2000, retail prices were fixed, limiting the reve
nue recovery for California utilities and forcing them into insolvency.47
In Florida, the state supreme court has interpreted a state power plant
siting statute to limit plant siting to only those suppliers who are
Florida utilities or who have contracts with Florida residents.48 The re
sult is to close Florida's wholesale power market to merchant power
plants, plants intended to compete in federally deregulated wholesale
power markets. For two consecutive terms, Florida's Legislature has
failed to amend its statute to override the supreme court interpreta
tion, ignoring the interpretation of the state regulatory agency charged
with enforcing it and an independent commission's recommenda
tions.49 Taking their cue from Florida's success in blocking the devel
opment of wholesale power supply, other state and local governments,
particularly in the South, have imposed moratoria on merchant power
plants.50
47.

See JOSKOW, supra note

7, at 1.

48. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that state's
power plant siting statute "was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a
proposed power plant output that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who
purchase electrical power at retail rates ").
49. See Steve Huettel,
2001, at lE.

Panel Okays Energy Plan,

ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 16,

50. See Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plants and the Need for a New
Regulatory Model, 13 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (Dec. 2000); Nervous of NOx, Southern Govs. Put
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If invoked by courts with the idea of limiting states' ability to
thwart the goals of federal policies, doctrines such as federal preemp
tion and the dormant commerce clause hold promise to limit, or at
least temper, the use of state political processes to thwart operation of
competitive markets in electric power. For instance, pursuant to fed
eral law, state regulatory commissions are required to allow the retail
utilities to recover the costs of FERC-mandated wholesale transac
tions and cannot disallow, or "trap," these costs by refusing to allow
the utility to recover them in retail rates, unless they are imprudently
incurred.51 According to one set of authors, "the case law points
strongly to the conclusion that California acted in violation of the Su
premacy Clause when it refused to allow Edison and PG&E to pass
through in retail rates the costs the two utilities incurred in purchasing
wholesale power from the California Power Exchange."52 Although
federal law does not have a definitive preemptive effect on rate caps,
California's policies raise the prospect for such challenges.53 Similarly,
Florida's restriction on siting out-of-state merchant plants raised fed
eral preemption issues against the backdrop of FERC's Order No.
888, which adopted a federal policy of competition in wholesale
power. Although FERC's rule did not preempt state regulators'
authority to regulate the legitimate environmental impacts of power
plant siting, FERC expressed a clear preference for relying on the
market, not state regulators, to determine the need for wholesale
power supply.
In addition to the argument that FERC's policies potentially pre
empted Florida's need restrictions on siting power plants, Florida's re
strictive siting statute raises the potential for dormant commerce
clause challenges to state regulations that impair competition, or
impermissibly discriminate against out-of-state commerce by favoring
in-state over out-of-state suppliers. Such arguments were raised before
Plants on Hold, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001; State Limits on Merchant Plants a
Growing Worry, GENERATION WK., Aug. 22, 2001 .
5 1 . This is the federal preemptive effect of the "filed rate " doctrine. See generally Mis
sissippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Nantahala
Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986). In the natural gas context, the Su
preme Court held that Congress's decision to substitute market-based prices for cost-of
service regulation does not alter the preemptive effect of the filed rate doctrine on the states.
See Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U.S. 409, 417-23
(1986). A limited exception to the doctrine, known as the Pike County exception, is recog
nized where a state commission declares a particular quantity of power unreasonably exces
sive and lower-cost power is available elsewhere. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 972. California's
utilities, however, were barred from purchasing power outside of the state's Power Ex
change.
52. Nicholas W. Fels & Frank
risdiction Over Electric Utilities, 22

R. Lindh, Lessons from the
ENERGY L.J. 1, 19 (2001).

California "Apocalypse:" Ju

53. Oddly, and to no avail, California regulators tried to turn the argument around, su
ing FERC for its failure to cap wholesale rates. The State Legislators Set to Sue Federal En
ergy Agency Power, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2001 , at BS.
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and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court,54 but the inadequacy of a
record establishing discrimination against out-of-state suppliers may
impede their acceptance by the court. As other states impose morato
ria on out-of-state merchant power plants that do not apply to in-state
utilities, we can expect constitutional challenges to the state protec
tionist policies to mount. Such constitutional challenges have already
been posed to state environmental regulations, many of which poten
tially favor in-state suppliers.55
A final, and increasingly important, regulatory federalism doctrine
that will increasingly affect competition in electric power is state ac
tion immunity from federal antitrust enforcement. Unlike federal pre
emption and dormant commerce clause doctrines, which limit public
actors, state action immunity relates to limits on the exercise of private
decisionmakers in violation of antitrust laws. In Parker v. Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court enunciated the rule that principles of federalism
immunize anticompetitive conduct pursuant to state laws restricting
competition from federal antitrust scrutiny because "[i]n a dual system
of government . . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress."56 Even before deregulation, state action immunity did not
insulate utilities from all antitrust suits.57 With federal deregulation
and uneven and partial state deregulation, the extent to which state
action immunity will immunize anticompetitive conduct from the
reach of federal antitrust law in a deregulated electric power market
remains unclear, particularly given the traditional extent to which
states have regulated electric utilities.
Early cases have affirmed, based on analysis of state regulations,
that a state regulatory policy prohibiting retail competition insulates a
state's utilities from antitrust suits by competing suppliers seeking ac
cess to retail transmission.58 But, with evolving state regulatory poli54. Tampa Elec. Co.v.Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000).
55. See Kirsten H. Engel, The
Regulation: The Case of Electricity
Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies in the
Have Come to the Wrong Place at the

Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based
Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999); Steven
Age of Deregulation: State-Imposed Preferences May
Wrong Time, FORTNIGHTLY., Dec. 1997.

56. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). State action immunity has developed into a two-part test,
today known as the "Midcal test." "First, the challenged restraint must be one 'clearly ar
ticulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; [and] second, the policy must be 'ac
tively supervised' by the State itself." California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.97, 105 (1980).
·

57. See, e.g., Cantor v.Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596 n.35 (1976) (finding utility
liable for illegal tying in connection with its program for distributing free light bulbs to resi
dential customers, even though the light bulb exchange program was part of the utility's ap
proved tariff); Gainesville Util. Dep't v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1978) (competing electric power companies conspired to divide the Florida wholesale power
market in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
58. See North Star Steel v. Mid-Am. Energy, 184 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
electric utility is protected by state action immunity from customer's antitrust suit based on
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cies, along with changes in both the industry and federal competition
policy, the regulatory basis for state action immunity is shifting and in
need of careful analysis. The federal government has declared a policy
of wholesale competition in power supply and, even following the
California fiasco, many states continue to express policies favoring re
tail competition. It is incumbent on federal courts to interpret the
scope and degree of continued regulation posed by state policies, but
state action immunity does not stand for automatic deference to the
states. As an illustration, consider the conflict between the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Tenth and Ninth Circuits. Notwithstanding claims
of dysfunctional interest group involvement in a state regulatory
scheme, evidence that is not directly relevant to the state action im
munity legal inquiry, the Tenth Circuit held that state action immunity
extends in a blanket manner to all utility sales regulated by the
Oklahoma Corporate Commission, precluding an antitrust suit by a
competitor who lost customers to a regulated utility.59 By contrast, the
Ninth Circuit held that an electrical cooperative's suit alleging that a
utility violated antitrust laws by refusing to allow the cooperative to
"wheel" (or provide access to its transmission facilities) to supply
power to the utility's customers was not subject to state action immu
nity in Idaho.(J()
The primary purpose of the state action doctrine is to respect fed
eralism concerns. But in a deregulatory era, courts should be wary of
blanket deference to state regulatory programs and instead should
look carefully to the scope and extent of specific regulatory provisions.
Although evidence of adverse interest group behavior in states is not
directly relevant to doctrinal application of the state action doctrine,
the potential of such behavior behooves careful judicial construction
of the specific scope and extent of state regulation in deciding to sus
pend application of antitrust law to private behaviors.61
refusal to allow customer access over transmission lines to alternate sources of electricity,
given Iowa's establishment of exclusive service territories for electric generation); TEC
Cogeneration v. Florida Power & Light Co., 184 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying state
action immunity to a utility's refusal to wheel power for cogenerators in its service territory,
given Florida's specific regulatory prohibition on such wheeling).
59. Trigen-Okla. City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec., 244 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that all of Oklahoma Gas & Electric's sales of electricity are regulated by the
state, and thus lawsuit by competitor who lost a customer to utility was subject to state ac
tion immunity).
60. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1 189 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
no active supervision of private agreements to divide customers, so state action immunity
does not apply). Another case refusing to extend state action to a dispute in emerging com
petition power markets is United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172,
176 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that contract provisions, required by the utility, that prohib
ited a customer from entering the electricity market as a competitor in the future in ex
change for a discounted electric rate, were not protected by the state action doctrine).
61. John Wiley has argued that courts should pay attention to interest group behavior in
resolving the application of state action immunity. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture
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Together, these regulatory federalism doctrines will help deter
mine the success of competition in electric power. The legal doctrines
have distinct purposes and are invoked in distinct regulatory conflicts,
but in the context of each of these doctrines courts must recognize that
federal competition policy, even if limited to wholesale supply mar
kets, cannot peacefully coexist with balkanized, protectionist regula
tion by individual states. Courts have developed longstanding doc
trines of regulatory law to guard against such conflicts. The potential
for interest group regulation gives rise to a need for narrow construc
tion of state authority, along with an expectation of clear articulation
of policies prohibiting competition by state regulators, in such con
texts. Federal courts might inform application of regulatory federalism
doctrines with awareness of the most egregious instances of interest
group capture of the state regulatory process. While this alone would
not guarantee the success of state regulation in the deregulatory envi
ronment - state politicians also must make the right choices about
substantive regulation - regulatory federalism holds promise for
promoting more successful state regulation in implementing competi
tion policy.
CONCLUSION

New regulation of the electric power industry and the operation of
its workers will be necessary, but regulators would be wise to ac
knowledge that a return to partial or full re-regulation of the industry
is unlikely to create more efficient markets in states like California.
Moreover, regulatory backlash in reaction to failed deregulatory poli
cies may risk recreating some of the very same problems that gave rise
to regulatory reform, coopted by deregulation advocates over the last
thirty years.62 The exercise of sound policy judgment is contingent on
the political process and the incentives it creates for both participants
and decisionmakers. Without the appropriate incentives, the state and
local political process for formulating economic regulations can easily
respond to the wrong signals. To be sure, as MacAvoy suggests, even
federal regulators sometimes make the wrong decisions. But because
Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 743 (1986). For criticism of this cap
ture theory approach, see Merrick B. Garland, A ntitrust and State Action: Economic Effi
ciency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 508-18 (1987). A more workable ap
proach, using a political process argument to incorporate dormant commerce clause analysis
into state action immunity doctrine, is presented in Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency,
the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow Consistent Free Market
Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1276 (1995) (arguing "not only do the political processes as

presently established fail to protect consumers from municipally established monopolies, but
these political processes also foster the creation of monopolies as ways of obscuring from the
voting public the extent to which society's assets are being misallocated").
62. For criticism of California's re-regulation response, see
July 21, 2001, at 26.
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so many of the details of electric power market operations remain in
state regulators' hands, the propensity for poor decisions is subject to
a different sort of interest group pressure and varied geographic solu
tions, especially given the emerging new interest groups Hirsh identi
fies, many of which are national rather than parochial in scope.
In light of recent events in the electric power industry, courts have
the opportunity to curb state power to respond to extreme interest
group politics. These recent events, particularly those in California,
will challenge future accounts of regulation and deregulation to strug
gle further with the theme of jurisdictional boundaries and, specifi
cally, how these boundaries influence interest group behavior in the
formulation of regulatory law. Regulatory law will remain important,
as deregulation of one aspect of this industry gives rise to a need to
regulate elsewhere, but jurisdictional clarity can only help policy
makers in discerning where that need is legitimate and where it is not.

